EU: Joint Statement on a United States-European Union framework on trade

The EU and US have issued a Joint Statement establishing a framework for fair, balanced and mutually beneficial transatlantic trade and investment. This Joint Statement confirms and builds on the political agreement reached by President von der Leyen and President Trump on 27 July.

The Joint Statement sets out the commitment on both sides to work towards restoring stability and predictability in EU-US trade and investment, for the benefit of businesses and citizens.

The key terms of the statement include:

1. The key terms include:
2. The European Union commits to removing tariffs on all U.S. industrial products and granting preferential market access to a broad spectrum of U.S. seafood and agricultural exports, including tree nuts, dairy products, fresh and processed fruits and vegetables, processed food items, planting seeds, soybean oil, as well as pork and bison meat. In addition, the EU will immediately take the steps required to renew the Joint Statement of 21 August 2020 on a Tariff Agreement concerning lobster—which expired on 31 July 2025—while expanding its scope to also include processed lobster.
3. The United States undertakes to apply, on EU-originating goods, the higher of either the U.S. Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariff rate or a tariff of 15%, the latter being composed of the MFN tariff plus a reciprocal tariff. Starting 1 September 2025, however, the United States will apply only the MFN tariff to specific EU products, namely unavailable natural resources (including cork), aircraft and aircraft parts, generic pharmaceuticals and their ingredients, and chemical precursors. Both sides also agree to explore the inclusion of additional sectors and goods of significance to their economies and value chains on this MFN-only tariff list.
4. The United States intends to ensure promptly that the tariff applied to EU-originating pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, and lumber subject to Section 232 measures—consisting of the MFN tariff plus the Section 232 tariff—does not exceed 15%. Once the EU formally submits the legislative proposal necessary to implement the tariff reductions outlined in Section 1 of this Framework Agreement, the United States will adjust tariffs on EU automobiles and automobile parts under Section 232 as follows: (i) EU goods with an MFN tariff of 15% or higher will not be subject to Section 232 tariffs; and (ii) EU goods with an MFN tariff lower than 15% will face a combined tariff of 15%, consisting of the MFN tariff and the Section 232 duty. These adjustments are expected to take effect on the first day of the month when the EU introduces its legislative proposal. The U.S. anticipates that the EU’s measures will be consistent with this Agreement and duly enacted by its legislatures. All U.S. adjustments to Section 232 tariffs will remain aligned with national security priorities. Regarding steel, aluminium, and related products, both sides intend to explore cooperative strategies to shield their markets from global overcapacity while maintaining secure bilateral supply chains, potentially including tariff-rate quota mechanisms.
5. The United States and the European Union agree to negotiate rules of origin to ensure that the benefits of the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade accrue mainly to the two parties.
6. Both sides commit to collaborating on securing reliable, diversified energy supplies, including by addressing non-tariff measures that could hinder bilateral trade in energy. As part of this, the EU intends to purchase U.S. liquefied natural gas, oil, and nuclear energy products worth an estimated $750 billion by 2028. In addition, the EU plans to procure at least $40 billion of U.S. artificial intelligence chips for its computing infrastructure. To protect sensitive technologies, the EU also plans to align its technology security standards with those of the United States to prevent leakage to destinations of concern. Once these requirements are in place, the U.S. will work to facilitate such exports.
7. With mutual investment stocks exceeding $5 trillion, the United States and the European Union reaffirm their position as one of the world’s largest economic partners and intend to further encourage and facilitate bilateral investment. Within this framework, European companies are expected to commit an additional $600 billion in U.S. strategic sectors by 2028, reflecting both Europe’s strong commitment to the transatlantic partnership and its recognition of the United States as a secure and innovative hub for investment.
8. The EU will significantly increase its procurement of U.S. military and defense equipment, supported by the U.S. government. This step underscores the shared strategic objective of deepening transatlantic defense-industrial ties, enhancing NATO interoperability, and ensuring European allies access to advanced and dependable defense technologies.
9. Both parties pledge to cooperate on reducing or eliminating non-tariff barriers. Regarding automobiles, they will mutually recognize each other’s standards. They will also strengthen cooperation between EU- and U.S.-based standards organizations to jointly identify and develop standards for key transatlantic sectors. Furthermore, the two sides will broaden the scope of conformity assessments to cover additional industrial areas.
10. Recognizing the need for continued dialogue to resolve longstanding issues, the EU and U.S. will work together to reduce non-tariff barriers to agricultural trade, including by simplifying requirements for sanitary certification of pork and dairy products.
11. Given that U.S. commodity production poses negligible deforestation risk, the EU will address U.S. concerns about the EU Deforestation Regulation, aiming to avoid disproportionate effects on U.S.-EU trade.
12. Responding to U.S. concerns about the treatment of small and medium-sized enterprises under the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), the European Commission—beyond the recently increased de minimis exception—commits to developing additional flexibilities in the CBAM’s implementation.
13. The EU undertakes to ensure that the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) and the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD) do not unduly restrict transatlantic trade. Regarding the CSDDD, this includes reducing administrative burdens, particularly for SMEs, proposing changes to liability and climate-transition requirements, and addressing U.S. concerns about the application of CSDDD obligations to non-EU companies with equivalent regulations.
14. The EU reaffirms that U.S. conformity assessment bodies may be designated as Notified Bodies under the 1998 EU-U.S. Agreement on Mutual Recognition (Sectoral Annex on Telecommunications Equipment), allowing them to carry out tasks under all essential requirements—including cybersecurity—of the Radio Equipment Directive 2014/53/EU. In addition, both sides commit to negotiating a mutual recognition agreement on cybersecurity.
15. The EU and the United States will strengthen cooperation in responding to third-country export restrictions on critical minerals and similar resources.
16. Both parties agree to discuss commitments aimed at upholding high standards of intellectual property protection and enforcement.
17. The U.S. and EU pledge to cooperate in ensuring strong protections for internationally recognized labor rights, including efforts to eliminate forced labor from supply chains.
18. Both sides commit to addressing unjustified barriers to digital trade. The EU confirms it will not introduce or maintain network usage fees, and neither party will impose customs duties on electronic transmissions. They also intend to support the World Trade Organization’s moratorium on such duties and to advocate for a permanent multilateral commitment.
19. The EU will consult with the United States and U.S. traders on the digitalization of trade procedures and on the implementation of its proposed Customs Reform legislation.
20. Finally, the United States and the European Union agree to reinforce economic security cooperation by aligning measures to improve supply chain resilience and innovation. This includes joint action against non-market policies of third countries, cooperation on inbound and outbound investment screening, export controls, and anti-duty evasion measures. Both parties will also address unfair competition, non-market practices, and asymmetries in public procurement, while pursuing coordinated implementation efforts.